By: Moore, Megan
Published by: National Institute on Money in Sate Politics, 2007
Via: Docuticker
State-level constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage in nine states in 2006 sparked $18 million in contributions to ballot measure committees formed to support or to oppose the amendments, a new study shows. Opponents of the measures raised three times more than proponents overall and raised more than proponents in every state except Tennessee, even though the amendments passed in every state except Arizona, the report by the National Institute on Money in State Politics found.
The 2006 same-sex amendment battles saw the formation of the Gill Action Fund to oppose the amendments, just as 2004 featured the rise of the Arlington Group, a national conservative Christian network, to promote them. Gay-rights activist Tim Gill — developer of the Quark software company — founded the Gill Action Fund, which contributed nearly $3.8 million to ballot measure committees in 2006. He also inspired other wealthy donors to give generously to committees opposing the amendments. Gill-related contributions made up nearly 38 percent of funds to opposing committees, or nearly $5.3 million, the report notes.
(http://www.followthemoney.org/press/Reports/200707231.pdf)
Wednesday, July 25, 2007
Tuesday, July 24, 2007
Gay sex and marriage, the reciprocal disadvantage problem, and the crisis in liberal constitutional theory
By: Seidman, LM
Published by: Georgetown Law Faculty Working Papers
Via: Docuticker
There is nothing unusual about constitutional controversy, but some disagreements, typified by the argument over constitutional protection for gay sex and marriage, go beyond ordinary differences of opinion. Some opponents of constitutional protection for gay rights think that their adversaries are not just wrong, but have exceeded the bounds of respectable constitutional argument. They want to turn the defense of gay constitutional rights into a position that dare not speak its name.
In this brief essay, I do not take a strong stand on whether the constitutional case for gay rights has been made out. Instead, I attempt to explain why these opponents are wrong to think that the case for gay rights is outside the range of reasonable constitutional argument and to speculate about why they nonetheless hold this view. While it is true that constitutional protection for gay rights depends upon contestable moral judgments, the failure to protect these rights also rests on such judgments. The argument that courts should not take a side in the “culture war” is therefore a wash. Conservatives are nonetheless eager to discredit the argument for gay rights because the failure to do so would challenge core assumptions of standard constitutional theory.
(http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=georgetown/fwps)
Published by: Georgetown Law Faculty Working Papers
Via: Docuticker
There is nothing unusual about constitutional controversy, but some disagreements, typified by the argument over constitutional protection for gay sex and marriage, go beyond ordinary differences of opinion. Some opponents of constitutional protection for gay rights think that their adversaries are not just wrong, but have exceeded the bounds of respectable constitutional argument. They want to turn the defense of gay constitutional rights into a position that dare not speak its name.
In this brief essay, I do not take a strong stand on whether the constitutional case for gay rights has been made out. Instead, I attempt to explain why these opponents are wrong to think that the case for gay rights is outside the range of reasonable constitutional argument and to speculate about why they nonetheless hold this view. While it is true that constitutional protection for gay rights depends upon contestable moral judgments, the failure to protect these rights also rests on such judgments. The argument that courts should not take a side in the “culture war” is therefore a wash. Conservatives are nonetheless eager to discredit the argument for gay rights because the failure to do so would challenge core assumptions of standard constitutional theory.
(http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=georgetown/fwps)
Love Counts
The economic benefits of Marriage Equality for New York
By: William C Thompson, Jr
Published by: Office of the New York City Comptroller, 2007
Via: Docuticker
This study by the New York Comptroller’s Office uses Williams Institute numbers to study the impact of legalizing marriage for same-sex couples. Their findings include that: marriage equality would provide economic benefits to New York State and New York City, especially in the years immediately following enactment of legislation granting this important civil right. The economic benefits would be derived primarily from the increase in visitors from other states who come to New York for the purpose of marrying or attending weddings. The Comptroller’s Office also investigated potential fiscal impacts. Weddings generate sales taxes and marriage license fees, and marriage may affect the income tax, estate taxes, and public spending on means-tested government transfer programs.
(http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/Love%20Counts.pdf)
By: William C Thompson, Jr
Published by: Office of the New York City Comptroller, 2007
Via: Docuticker
This study by the New York Comptroller’s Office uses Williams Institute numbers to study the impact of legalizing marriage for same-sex couples. Their findings include that: marriage equality would provide economic benefits to New York State and New York City, especially in the years immediately following enactment of legislation granting this important civil right. The economic benefits would be derived primarily from the increase in visitors from other states who come to New York for the purpose of marrying or attending weddings. The Comptroller’s Office also investigated potential fiscal impacts. Weddings generate sales taxes and marriage license fees, and marriage may affect the income tax, estate taxes, and public spending on means-tested government transfer programs.
(http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/Love%20Counts.pdf)
Thursday, February 01, 2007
Beyond interstate recognition in the Same-Sex Marriage debate
Cornell Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series
By: Simon GJ
Published in: UC Davis Law Review, 40(2). December 2006
Via: Docuticker
The national same-sex marriage debate has been dominated for the past decade by the interstate recognition issue. This article seeks to shift the focus of the debate to same-sex marriage prohibitions themselves and their incompatibility with several limitations of federal constitutional law.
After showing the legal irrelevance of the Defense of Marriage Act to the interstate recognition issue, the article addresses the proper resolution of that choice-of-law issue through the lens of a well-known New York Court of Appeals decision. In that case, despite New York's ban on uncle-niece marriage, the New York high court - one of the most respected state supreme courts over the years in choice-of-law matters - applied Rhode Island law to uphold the validity of an uncle-niece marriage in Rhode Island between two New Yorkers. On its face, the case appears to offer powerful support for recognizing an out-of-state same-sex marriage that is valid where formed, but as the article demonstrates, the court's choice of law is so difficult to defend that it actually militates against interstate recognition of same-sex marriage.
However, as the article's juxtaposition of the uncle-niece and same-sex marriage recognition issues highlights, same-sex marriage recognition is not simply a matter of choice of law. While the Constitution leaves states free to allow or ban uncle-niece marriage, states do not have such latitude in legislating about same-sex marriage. The article maintains that prohibitions on same-sex marriage violate the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Establishment Clauses.
By: Simon GJ
Published in: UC Davis Law Review, 40(2). December 2006
Via: Docuticker
The national same-sex marriage debate has been dominated for the past decade by the interstate recognition issue. This article seeks to shift the focus of the debate to same-sex marriage prohibitions themselves and their incompatibility with several limitations of federal constitutional law.
After showing the legal irrelevance of the Defense of Marriage Act to the interstate recognition issue, the article addresses the proper resolution of that choice-of-law issue through the lens of a well-known New York Court of Appeals decision. In that case, despite New York's ban on uncle-niece marriage, the New York high court - one of the most respected state supreme courts over the years in choice-of-law matters - applied Rhode Island law to uphold the validity of an uncle-niece marriage in Rhode Island between two New Yorkers. On its face, the case appears to offer powerful support for recognizing an out-of-state same-sex marriage that is valid where formed, but as the article demonstrates, the court's choice of law is so difficult to defend that it actually militates against interstate recognition of same-sex marriage.
However, as the article's juxtaposition of the uncle-niece and same-sex marriage recognition issues highlights, same-sex marriage recognition is not simply a matter of choice of law. While the Constitution leaves states free to allow or ban uncle-niece marriage, states do not have such latitude in legislating about same-sex marriage. The article maintains that prohibitions on same-sex marriage violate the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Establishment Clauses.
Friday, December 15, 2006
Holliday Season!
Dear ReadersYet another year has flown by. And it was a busy year indeed! I am going to take a well-deserved break, and will start posting again at breakneck speed in the New Year.
I hope that Gender Focus and its sister blogs have been of some help to you, and will continue to do so in the future. So look forward to a bumper crop of posts early in January 2007, as I will endeavor to bring you all up to speed with what has been happening over the holiday season.
Have a great time, and a Happy New Year!
Monday, December 11, 2006
Same-sex marriage initiatives and lesbian, gay and bisexual voters in the 2006 elections
Published by: National Gay and Lesbian Task Force
Via: DocuTicker
Bans on same-sex marriage performed more poorly in the November 2006 elections than in the past, in part due to their declining appeal in states with smaller “born-again” Christian populations, according to a study released today by the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Policy Institute. If current trends hold, such bans would fail at the ballot box in many of the states that have not yet considered same-sex marriage initiatives.
Same-sex marriage bans passed with an average of 64 percent of voter support in all states in 2006, down from a similar figure of 71 percent in 2004. But support has fallen even more dramatically in states where those identifying themselves as born-again or evangelical Christians make up an identifiable minority of residents, according to the report.
Via: DocuTicker
Bans on same-sex marriage performed more poorly in the November 2006 elections than in the past, in part due to their declining appeal in states with smaller “born-again” Christian populations, according to a study released today by the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Policy Institute. If current trends hold, such bans would fail at the ballot box in many of the states that have not yet considered same-sex marriage initiatives.
Same-sex marriage bans passed with an average of 64 percent of voter support in all states in 2006, down from a similar figure of 71 percent in 2004. But support has fallen even more dramatically in states where those identifying themselves as born-again or evangelical Christians make up an identifiable minority of residents, according to the report.
Thursday, August 31, 2006
Presuming women
Revisiting the presumption of legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples era
By: Appleton SF
Published in: Boston University Law Review, Vol. 86, 2006
Via: SSRN
One of family law's most venerable doctrines, the presumption of legitimacy, has reached a critical crossroads. On the one hand, this doctrine, which recognizes a woman's husband as the father of her children, has been eroding in recent years, thanks to both the decreasing disadvantages of illegitimacy and the increasing ability to determine genetic paternity. On the other hand, this doctrine is getting a "second wind" as one of the traditional (and gendered) benefits of marriage that some states newly have made available to same-sex couples.
Using a functional test, which many scholars and law-reform efforts advocate, this analysis considers the extent to which the presumption, as a default rule of parentage, makes sense today for families - whether formed by traditional different-sex couples, gay male couples, or lesbian couples. The analysis concludes that a modernized version of the presumption is worth preserving for traditional couples and worth extending to lesbian couples. This extension to lesbian couples is consistent with the outcomes (but not the reasoning) of a handful of very recent judicial decisions. The analysis fails, however, to reach a similar conclusion concerning an extension of a modernized presumption to gay male couples.
The extension to lesbian couples turns out to hold promise for resolving some of the new difficulties encountered by the presumption in traditional settings, with the advent of sophisticated genetic testing. The failure to extend the presumption to gay male couples raises important questions not only about the increasingly apparent split between some feminist theorists and gay rights advocates, despite their shared opposition to gender stereotypes, but also about the value to be accorded to gender neutrality, the role to be given to functional analysis, and the room to be left for officially privileged relationships in contemporary family law.
By: Appleton SF
Published in: Boston University Law Review, Vol. 86, 2006
Via: SSRN
One of family law's most venerable doctrines, the presumption of legitimacy, has reached a critical crossroads. On the one hand, this doctrine, which recognizes a woman's husband as the father of her children, has been eroding in recent years, thanks to both the decreasing disadvantages of illegitimacy and the increasing ability to determine genetic paternity. On the other hand, this doctrine is getting a "second wind" as one of the traditional (and gendered) benefits of marriage that some states newly have made available to same-sex couples.
Using a functional test, which many scholars and law-reform efforts advocate, this analysis considers the extent to which the presumption, as a default rule of parentage, makes sense today for families - whether formed by traditional different-sex couples, gay male couples, or lesbian couples. The analysis concludes that a modernized version of the presumption is worth preserving for traditional couples and worth extending to lesbian couples. This extension to lesbian couples is consistent with the outcomes (but not the reasoning) of a handful of very recent judicial decisions. The analysis fails, however, to reach a similar conclusion concerning an extension of a modernized presumption to gay male couples.
The extension to lesbian couples turns out to hold promise for resolving some of the new difficulties encountered by the presumption in traditional settings, with the advent of sophisticated genetic testing. The failure to extend the presumption to gay male couples raises important questions not only about the increasingly apparent split between some feminist theorists and gay rights advocates, despite their shared opposition to gender stereotypes, but also about the value to be accorded to gender neutrality, the role to be given to functional analysis, and the room to be left for officially privileged relationships in contemporary family law.
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